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Abstract:
The main purpose of the note is two-fold (i) Correcting an error in the two-part tariff licensing
contract, and (ii) Altering one of the main results following the two-part tariff analysis in
Mukherjee, A. and Mukherjee S., (2013), Economics Letters. This also strengthens the primary
conclusion of Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2013).
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Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2013) (henceforth MM (2013) showed that in a Cournot
framework, under a fixed-fee licensing contract if the licensor and the licensee bargain over the
licensing fee, licensing decreases (increases) innovation incentives vis-a-vis no licensing for low
(high) cost innovation. This is an interesting result to see the impact of licensing on innovation
incentive of competing firms. MM (2013) also claims that a two-part tariff licensing always
increases innovation incentive regardless of innovation cost. We believe this second result is not
correct and revise the result here.
More specifically, the main purpose of this note is two-fold. (i) Correcting an error in the twopart tariff analysis in MM (2013). In particular, we show that the optimal licensing contract derived
in the section 3.2 (page 501) is not correct and we provide the correct solution. (ii) This also leads
to a correction of Proposition 4, one of the main results of their paper regarding innovation
incentive of the firm(s). This correction and revision further strengthens the main research findings
of MM (2013). It also makes the main result more robust and consistent in the sense that in this
framework, innovation incentives of firm(s) qualitatively remains unchanged under different
licensing contracts.
We refer to MM (2013) for the basic model of the analysis and keep all the notations same
here to be consistent. We only focus on those parts of the paper of MM (2013) which need to be
addressed. The rest of the analysis and findings in MM (2013) remain unchanged.

Licensing of Innovation
Two-Part Tariff Analysis (Discussed in section 3.2 in MM 2013)
As in MM (2013), without loss of generality, let us assume firm 1 to be the innovating firm with
bargaining power 𝛼𝛼 (0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 1) and firm 2 to be the non-innovating firm with bargaining power
(1 − 𝛼𝛼). Firm 1 offers a two-part tariff licensing contract (𝐹𝐹, 𝑟𝑟) to firm 2, where 𝐹𝐹 is the fixed
fee and 𝑟𝑟 is the per unit royalty.

The problem for firm 1 can be expressed as
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Now, 𝐹𝐹 must be 0 (restricting attention to 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 0), otherwise firm 2 (licensee) would be worse-

off after licensing. But then [𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴] = −(1 − 𝛼𝛼)c
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Therefore 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑐𝑐 and 𝐹𝐹 = 0 cannot be a solution. MM (2013) mistakenly claimed this as the
general solution.
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Given 𝐹𝐹 = 0, we have 5𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − 4(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴 = 9 [5r 2 − 5ar + (1 − 6α)c 2 + (2 + 3α)ac].
Let 5𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 − 4(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴 = 0 (⇔
𝑎𝑎

𝑟𝑟 = 2 −

𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼 𝐵𝐵1−𝛼𝛼

�5(𝑎𝑎−2𝑐𝑐)(5𝑎𝑎+2𝑐𝑐−12𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼)
10

𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕

= 0) and solving for 𝑟𝑟 we get

.

Therefore, the general Nash-bargained two-part tariff solution is
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Hence, we also show that the optimal licensing contract in this environment is pure royalty. From
the expression of 𝑟𝑟 ∗ , it is also clear that the optimal royalty increases with bargaining power 𝛼𝛼,

an intuitive result.

Given above, the expressions (the ‘Innovation’ and the ‘No innovation’ cell) in Table 3 (page 501)
in MM (2013) needs to be revised as well since the final pay-offs of both firms will now look
different (see below).
Revised Table 3: The Payoffs of Firm 1 and Firm 2
Firm2
Innovation

Firm1

No Innovation

Innovation 𝜋𝜋1 (0, 0) − 𝑘𝑘,
No
Innovation

𝜋𝜋2 (0, 0) − 𝑘𝑘
𝜋𝜋1 (𝑟𝑟 ∗ , 0)

𝜋𝜋2 (𝑟𝑟 ∗ , 0) + 𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝑞𝑞1∗ (𝑟𝑟 ∗ , 0) − 𝑘𝑘

𝜋𝜋1 (0, 𝑟𝑟 ∗ ) + 𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝑞𝑞2∗ (0, 𝑟𝑟 ∗ ) − 𝑘𝑘
𝜋𝜋1 (𝑐𝑐, 𝑐𝑐),

𝜋𝜋2 (0, 𝑟𝑟 ∗ )
𝜋𝜋2 (𝑐𝑐, 𝑐𝑐)

More importantly, this correction changes the result in Proposition 4 of MM (2013). The correct
statement of Proposition 4 should be as follows.

Proposition 4 (Revised)
(a) If 𝑘𝑘 ∈ (𝑋𝑋 ∗ , 𝑋𝑋), both firms innovate under no-licensing but only one firm innovates with two-

part tariff licensing. Therefore, two-part tariff licensing reduces innovation vis-à-vis no-licensing
for a range of low-cost innovation.
(b) If 𝑘𝑘 ∈ (𝑌𝑌, 𝑌𝑌 ∗ ), neither firm innovates with no-licensing whereas exactly one firm innovates

with two-part tariff licensing. Therefore, two-part tariff licensing increases innovation vis-a-vis
no- licensing for a range of high-cost innovation.
Proof: See Appendix.
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Thus the effect of bargained two-part tariff licensing on innovation incentive is qualitatively
similar to the bargained fixed fee licensing given in Proposition 3 in MM (2013). 1 Note that if
𝛼𝛼 = 1, 𝑟𝑟 ∗ = 𝑐𝑐 and therefore we get 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑋𝑋 ∗ . Only in this situation, under two-part tariff licensing,
technology transfer increases innovation unambiguously. Thus Proposition 4 of MM (2013) holds
only for 𝛼𝛼 = 1 and not for 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1).

The innovation incentives under two-part tariff licensing compared to no licensing is shown in the
figure below:

Figure 1: Innovation Incentive under two-part tariff licensing compared with no licensing
(Cost of innovation increases towards the right)
In the Appendix (page 502) of MM (2013), where the welfare analysis is done under two-part tariff
licensing, some revision is in order. In particular, the statement “consumer surplus remains the
same” needs to be corrected. Under the correct two-part tariff analysis there would be an increase
in consumer surplus as the price of the good will fall as long as 𝛼𝛼 < 1 and therefore, overall
welfare will indeed increase compared to no-licensing case.

1

However, it is now clear that bargained fee fixed fee licensing in MM (2013) is suboptimal in a complete information
model for the innovator which was not identified in MM (2013). Nevertheless, it is well understood that if
implementing a royalty licensing is difficult due to observational issue of the licensee’s output, then fixed fee licensing
is the only feasible licensing arrangement.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4:
We need to check the innovation incentive under the two-part tariff contract. To fix ideas consider
the incentive for firm 1 (similar argument will hold for firm 2 as well).
From Table-3, we get that both firms will invest in R&D if 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝜋𝜋1 (0, 0) − 𝜋𝜋1 (𝑟𝑟 ∗ , 0) ≡ 𝑋𝑋 ∗ . Now
since 𝑟𝑟 ∗ < 𝑐𝑐 for 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1) , we get 𝜋𝜋1 (𝑟𝑟 ∗ , 0) > 𝜋𝜋1 (𝑐𝑐, 0) . Therefore 𝜋𝜋1 (0, 0) − 𝜋𝜋1 (𝑟𝑟 ∗ , 0) =
𝑋𝑋 ∗ < 𝜋𝜋1 (0, 0) − 𝜋𝜋1 (𝑐𝑐, 0) ≡ 𝑋𝑋. Thus the range for which both firms innovate shrinks compared to
the no licensing case.
Again the range of R&D cost for which only one firm innovates is

𝑋𝑋 ∗ = 𝜋𝜋1 (0, 0) − 𝜋𝜋1 (𝑟𝑟 ∗ , 0) < 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝜋𝜋1 (0, 𝑟𝑟 ∗ ) − 𝜋𝜋1 (𝑐𝑐, 𝑐𝑐) + 𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝑞𝑞2∗ (0, 𝑟𝑟 ∗ ) ≡ 𝑌𝑌 ∗

Since 𝑟𝑟 ∗ comes from a bargained solution and 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1), it must be the case that 𝜋𝜋1 (0, 𝑟𝑟 ∗ ) +
𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝑞𝑞2∗ (0, 𝑟𝑟 ∗ ) > 𝜋𝜋1 (0, 𝑐𝑐), i.e., post bargaining two-part tariff contract the innovator must be betteroff compared to no licensing. Therefore,𝑌𝑌 ∗ = 𝜋𝜋1 (0, 𝑟𝑟 ∗ ) + 𝑟𝑟 ∗ 𝑞𝑞2∗ (0, 𝑟𝑟 ∗ ) − 𝜋𝜋1 (𝑐𝑐, 𝑐𝑐) > 𝜋𝜋1 (0, 𝑐𝑐) −
𝜋𝜋1 (𝑐𝑐, 𝑐𝑐) ≡ 𝑌𝑌.
Note that given the demand and cost specifications, we have X < Y. This completes the proof.
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